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HISTORIC PRESERVATION GRANTS TO HOUSES OF WORSHIP:A CASE STUDY IN THE SURVIVAL OF SEPARATIONISM(forthcoming, 2002, in Symposium, Shifting Into Neutral? Emerging Perspectives on theSeparation of Church and State, Boston College Law Review)
Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle1
The relationship between government and places of worship presents questions as old asthe Republic.  Although these questions arise in many contexts,2 our primary focus is on theproblem of historic preservation.   Courts have decided a number of important cases about therights of religious institutions to resist historical landmarking and the strict governmental
3    See, e.g., St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (1990); FirstCovenant Church v. Seattle, 840 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1992); Society of Jesus of New England v.Boston Landmarks Commission, 409 Mass. 38, 564 N.E.2d 571 (1990); East Bay Asian LocalDevelopment Corp. v. California, 13 P.3d 1122 (Ca. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1735 (2001).We discuss these cases in Part IIIA., infra.  
4 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
5  The only secondary materials we have located on this subject are Louis R. Cohen,Religious Freedoms: Historic Preservation Grants and the Establishment Clause, ALI-ABACourse of Study Materials: Historic Preservation Law (October 2001); Dina A. Keever, Note,Public Funds and the Historical Preservation of Churches: Preserving History or AdvancingReligion?, 21 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 1327 (1994).
6 The one that comes closest is Frohliger v Richardson, 63 Cal. App. 209, 218 P 497 (Cal.Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1923), a 1923 decision of the California Supreme Court on the permissibility ofstate financial support for preserving the San Diego mission.  That case did not involve theprospect of a coercive regulatory regime, pursuant to which the mission’s owners would haveobligations to preserve the structure unchanged, being imposed upon the mission.
7 We develop at length the concepts of Separationism and Neutralism in Ira C. Lupu &Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47Vill. L. Rev. 37 (2002) (hereafter, “Distinctive Place”). 2
controls over property that accompany that status.3  Indeed,  City of Boerne v. Flores,4    the casein which the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as appliedto the states, arose in the context of precisely such a dispute.   Our attention, however, will be on the expenditure side of the historic preservationquestion – to what extent may the state make grants and loans to assist in the historicpreservation of buildings which are under coercive preservation regimes, and which are devotedto religious use?5   To our knowledge, there are no judicial decisions on this subject,6 althoughstate administrative officers face the question regularly.  True Separationists oppose both thelandmarking of worship sites, and the payment of grants to owners of these sites if they are solandmarked, while  committed Neutralists favor both the regulation and support of houses ofworship for historic preservation to precisely the same extent as other structures.7  And there of
8 Those whom we call Religionists, see Distinctive Place, note 7 supra, at 48, systematically favor whatever will help religious institutions; in this context, that would involvepreservation grants for religious institutions without preservation regulations and orders.  Thosewhom we call Secularists, see id. at 48-49, systematically disfavor whatever would help suchinstitutions; here, that would involve making them subject to coercive regulation while barringthem from grants.  We do not think a principled account of the Religion Clauses can be attachedto either of these views.  As we explain in more detail at text at notes 43-45 infra, we believe thatReligion Clause symmetry  – pursuant to which constitutional limits on government interferencewith religion map precisely onto the limits of government sponsorship of religion – is anecessary condition of a persuasive account of the Religion Clauses.3
course may be other, less symmetrical formulations that should be open for consideration.8  The paper will proceed as follows.  Part I will highlight themes in the historical andjudicial legacy of American Separationism, particularly as they apply to expenditures in supportof the physical structures of religious entities.  Part II will sketch the rise of the Neutralityprinciple and the decline – still incomplete – of the Separationist paradigm over the past twentyyears.  The paper’s centerpiece, Part III, turns to the particulars of historic preservation.  PartIIIA. addresses the struggle over the question of regulatory exemptions, for structures devoted toreligious use, from historic preservation laws.  Part IIIB. introduces an intriguing pair of duelinglegal opinions, from prominent executive branch lawyers, on the question of the constitutionalpermissibility of government grants for historic preservation of religious structures.  Part IIIC.describes in detail the current patterns, policies, and practices of government, federal and state, with respect to financial support for historic preservation of such structures, and contrasts thesepatterns of financial support with those currently in place in other government programs in whichgovernment may support financially the physical structures owned by religious entities.  Finally,Part IV will appraise the details unpacked earlier in light of the larger, contemporary strugglebetween Separationism and Neutralism to become the dominant Religion Clause paradigm. 
9 The Memorial & Remonstrance is set out as an Appendix to Justice Rutledge’s dissentin Everson v. Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947).
10 The primary contribution of the Memorial & Remonstrance was its focus on theadvantages to government, as well as to religion, that would ensue from extensive church-stateseparation.  For a thorough analysis of the distinctive contribution of the Memorial &Remonstrance and an analysis of the ways its lessons might inform the contemporary debateabout school vouchers, see Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: SevenQuestions from Madison’s Memorial & Remonstrance, 87 Corn. L. Rev. xx (2002).  
11 Id. at 74 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).  The proposed assessment bill permitted Quakersand Mennonites to promote their mode of worship as they saw fit, presumably because neithersect had clergy or houses of worship. 
12 Id. at 13. 4
I.  Government Support for Religious Structures  – The Separationist LegacyAs all students of Religion Clause history know, James Madison’s Memorial andRemonstrance Against Religious Assessments9 is the most important statement about theAmerican attitude toward church-state relations in the early days of the Republic.  Its publicationin 1784, and its success in turning the political tide in Virginia just three years before thePhiladelphia Convention from which the new federal Constitution was to emerge, marked atectonic shift in the structure of argumentation in America on state support for religion.10   TheMemorial and Remonstrance had as its target a particular religious assessment bill, which wasdesigned to appropriate money for Christian sects in Virginia.   Each of those sects, uponreceiving the funds allocated to it by taxpayer designation, would have been obliged to spendthem on “a provision for a Minister or Teacher of the Gospel . . . or to providing places of divineworship.”11  Madison’s objections to the bill won the day; it was defeated, and in its stead theVirginia Assembly enacted  Jefferson’s Bill for Religious Liberty, which provided in part “[t]hatno man shall be compelled to . . . support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever . ..”12
13 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, xx (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
14 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
15 403 U.S. 672 (1971).  The Court decided Tilton on the same day in 1971 as Lemon v.Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 5
There is of course considerable debate over the extent to which this Virginia historyshould be taken as the measure of meaning for the Establishment Clause of the FirstAmendment.13  Whatever the right answer to that question may be, however, there can be nodoubt that the Founding Generation saw compulsory taxation to pay for salary of clergy, and theconstruction of houses of worship, as a constitutional problem of the highest magnitude.  It would take more than one hundred years before the Supreme Court would confront issues of government financial support for physical structures associated with religiousinstitutions.  In Bradfield v. Roberts,14 decided in 1899, the Court rejected an EstablishmentClause challenge to a federal appropriation for a hospital building, to be devoted exclusively tothe medical care of those with contagious disease, at a medical facility controlled by the RomanCatholic Church.  The Court focused on the building’s purposes, not the identity of the owner,and ruled that the secularity of those purposes precluded the expenditure from being anestablishment of religion. Over seventy years later, at a moment of apex for the Separationist paradigm, theSupreme Court reaffirmed the principle of Bradfield in Tilton v. Richardson.15   Tilton upheld aseries of federal construction grants, authorized by the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963,to church-affiliated colleges and universities.  The grants supported construction of libraries,  alanguage laboratory, and buildings for science, and music and art.  The Act expressly excluded“any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship, or . . .any facility which . . . is used or to be used primarily in connection with any part of the program
16 In Lemon, by contrast, the Court found that the pervasively sectarian character of mostof the aided elementary and secondary schools made it impossible to monitor the secularity ofthe expenditures without the entanglement becoming constitutionally excessive.  Id. at xxx. 
17 403 U.S. at xxx (plurality); xxx (White, J., concurring); xxx (Black, Marshall, andDouglas, dissenting); and xxx (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
18 413 U.S. 734 (1973). 6
of a school or department of divinity . . . “ A four-Justice plurality, augmented by Justice White’sconcurrence, concluded that the statute authorized, and the Constitution did not forbid, grants tochurch-affiliated institutions.  The constitutional reasoning of the plurality depended heavily onthe fact that the schools that had received the grants had not been shown to be “pervasivelysectarian” and had maintained the federally supported buildings in a scrupulously secularfashion.  Moreover, the plurality concluded that the monitoring required to insure that theschools complied with the secular use restrictions would not lead to forbidden entanglementsbetween the state and religiously affiliated institutions.16The Court in Tilton was unanimous, however, in striking down one portion of the federalscheme.  As originally enacted, the program had limited to twenty years the “secular use”restriction on federally subsidized buildings.  The expiration of the twenty-year period wouldhave permitted the school to make sectarian uses of the building, and this, everyone on the Courtagreed,17 would involve the government in impermissibly advancing religion.  Accordingly, theCourt held that the restriction must, by force of constitutional requirement, extend for the life ofthe building.A few years later, in Hunt v. McNair,18 the Court extended the “secular use” principle ofBradfield and Tilton to actions of a state issuing revenue bonds, as part of a religion-neutralprogram, for the purpose of financing capital improvements at the Baptist College of Charleston. As in Tilton, the program included explicit restrictions on the use of bond-financed structures; all
19 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
20Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. granted Zelman v.Simmons-Harris, 533 U.S. 976 (2001).  See id. at 953-54 (discussing Committee for PublicEducation v. Nyquist).  The Nyquist decision also provides the central focus of a number of thebriefs filed in the U.S. Supreme Court in the Zelman case.  See, e.g., Brief for Respondents DorisSimmons-Harris, et.al., 2000 U.S. Briefs 1751 (invoking Nyquist as authority for upholding thedecision of the lower courts).  But see, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus CuriaeSupporting Petitioners, 2000 US Briefs 1751, at *10 (distinguishing Nyquist and questioning itscontinued authority).   For our views on Zelman, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sites ofRedemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers and Sectarian Service Providers, xxJ. Law & Politics xx, in Symposium, The End of Separatism (forthcoming, 2002).7
uses for sectarian instruction or worship were forbidden.  Moreover, the bond scheme did notinvolve any direct transfer of government funds to the aided institution.  The funds all came fromprivate investors, assured of tax-favorable treatment by the state’s participation in the scheme.  Ina 6-3 ruling, the Court held that such a scheme did not have the purpose or primary effect ofadvancing religion, nor did it involve the state in excessive monitoring of the religious affairs ofthe school.Bradfield, Tilton, and Hunt all approved of state support for secular uses of whollysecular structures at religiously controlled institutions.  None of the three, however, involved thequestion of permissibility of state support for buildings devoted to worship and sectarianteaching.  With respect to that question, which resides in greater proximity to the  problem of theVirginia Assessment, there is but one key Supreme Court decision – Committee for PublicEducation v. Nyquist,19  also decided in the midst of Separationism’s fullest flowering.These days, Nyquist is best known as the decision at the center of the controversy overschool vouchers,20 because the case involved grants and so-called “tuition tax credits” for thebenefit of parents whose children attended private schools, sectarian or otherwise.  Anotherfeature of the legislation invalidated in Nyquist, however, involved “maintenance and repair”grants to nonpublic schools, designed to aid them in the upkeep of their physical facilities.  The
21 Only Justice White dissented from this portion of the Court’s opinion, and he did sowith virtually no elaboration of his reasons.  Id. at 820. 
22 Id. at 774.
23 Id. at 777 (citing, inter alia, Everson v. Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947): “Theimposition of taxes to pay ministers’ salaries and to build and maintain churches and and churchproperty aroused their indignation.  It was these feelings which found expression in [the Establishment Clause of] the First Amendment.”).8
state calculated the amount of these grants on a per pupil basis, subject to a maximum basedupon comparable expenditures in the public school system, and did not impose any “secular use”restriction upon the grants.  By a vote of 8-1,21 the Supreme Court struck down the grants for “maintenance andrepair.”  The central portion of its discussion is as follows:22No attempt is made to restrict payments to those expenditures used exclusively forsecular purposes, nor do we think it possible within the context of these religion-orientedinstitutions to impose such restrictions.  Nothing in the statute, for instance, bars a qualifyingschool from paying out of state funds the salaries of employees who maintain the school chapel,or the cost of renovating classrooms in which religion is taught, or the cost of heating andlighting those same facilities.  Absent appropriate restrictions on [such] expenditures, it simplycannot be denied that [these grants have] a primary effect that advances religion in that [they] subsidize[] directly the religious activities of sectarian elementary and secondary schools. Moreover, after invoking that portion of Tilton v. Richardson which invalidated thecomplete reversion of federally financed buildings, after twenty years, to the unrestricted use of religiously affiliated colleges, the Nyquist Court concluded this portion of its opinion with acategorical assertion that hearkened back to the controversy over the Virginia Assessment.  “Ifthe State may not erect buildings in which religious activities are to take place,” Justice Powellwrote, “it may not maintain such buildings or renovate them when they fall into disrepair.”23  Nyquist thus stands as the singular and unchallenged Supreme Court precedent on theissue of state support for structures whose uses include worship or religious instruction.  Amongits central premises, of course, is that religious elementary and secondary schools are likely to be
24 The opinions in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000), cast substantial doubt on thecontinuing vitality of the idea that  “pervasively sectarian” are under special disabilities in thereceipt of government benefits.  A 4-Justice plurality in Mitchell explicitly repudiates theconcept, id. at xxx, and the concurring opinion by Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, id.at xxx, does not rely upon it and reaches a result inconsistent with it.   See also Maryland HigherEduc. Ass’n v. Columbia Union College, 527 U.S. 1013 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial ofcertiorari, and arguing for reconsideration of the concept of “pervasively sectarian” institutions).
25 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
26 Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001).  See also  Lamb’sChapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Rosenberger v. Rector9
“pervasively sectarian,” so that any unrestricted transfers to their operations will have aforbidden  “primary effect” of advancing religion.   However controversial it may be today tocategorize such schools in this way,24 there can be little doubt of the sectarian character ofbuildings devoted exclusively to worship.   If such structures are constitutionally distinctive, asthe Court in Nyquist assumed and as our constitutional history appears to support, governmentgrants to preserve them seem entirely impermissible.  II.  The Movement toward NeutralismIn the Separationist world described in Part I, grants for the preservation of structuresdevoted to worship would seem impossible to sustain constitutionally.  Over the past twentyyears, however, the grip of Separationism on the law of the Religion Clauses has declined, andthe paradigm of Neutralism has ascended.   Has this trend changed the landscape sufficiently towarrant a different outcome on the permissibility of such grants?The shift to Neutralism has had three major components, only one of which bears directlyon the issue of historic preservation grants.  First, for the past twenty years, the Supreme Courthas been vigorously enforcing rights of equal access to various public fora for religious causesand speakers.  This line of cases, starting with Widmar v. Vincent25 and running through theGood News Club26 decision in 2001, represents a repudiation of an extreme version of
& Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
27 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schemmp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421(1962).
28 Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
29 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
30 This proposition is true outside of public schools as well as inside of them.  The entirequestion of impermissible government “endorsement” of religion is bound up with the idea thatthe state may not be neutral between religious and nonreligious messages when governmentspeaks.  Compare Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) with Capitol Square Reviewand Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
31See Santa Fe. Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (public school may notsponsor student-uttered prayer over public address system at high school football game).  For animportant recent effort to grapple with the problem of religious utterances by students in variouspublic school contexts, see Kathleen A. Brady, The Push to Private Religious Expression: AreWe Missing Something?, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1147 (2002). 10
Separationism, pursuant to which private religious speech is compulsorily excluded frompublicly controlled space.  This entire development arose out of the overreaction of local officialsto the School Prayer Cases;27 although those decisions had involved only situations of officiallysponsored worship in public schools, some local governments had erroneously extended theconcerns of the School Prayer Cases to wholly private speech in public settings.  Nevertheless,the recent decisions involving prayer at public school sporting events28 and commencements,29when measured against the backdrop of the equal access decisions of the past two decades,demonstrate that Neutralism extends to private speech in public fora but does NOT extend togovernment sponsored speech.30   When government speaks, or private parties speak in contextsin which the message is attributable to the government, some version of Separationism stillcontrols.31  The second major development in the direction of Neutralism appeared in 1990, in the
32 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
33 Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious FreedomRestoration Act, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 171, 176-185 (1995).
34 For the rare but important case in which a particular sect had been so targeted, see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).11
form of the Supreme Court’s surprisingly broad decision in Employment Division v. Smith.32 Smith held that courts should no longer apply the compelling interest test to claims of exemption,based upon the Free Exercise Clause, from religion-neutral, general laws.   Although the pre-Smith law had not been nearly so religion-friendly as the opponents of Smith would have usbelieve,33 the rhetorical structure of Free Exercise doctrine had indeed been marked by aSeparationist character; prior to Smith, claims that general legal norms burdened religiouslymotivated choices triggered an inquiry that was not similarly triggered by burdens on choicesmotivated by nonreligious reasons.   Smith’s Neutralist move, therefore, was to remit religion-based claims against general laws to precisely the same status as claims based on other reasonsfor desiring to be free of such laws.   If such laws violated other constitutional protections – freespeech, or privacy, for example – courts would strike them.  If, however, the laws did not targetreligion by singling it out for disfavored treatment,34 Free Exercise norms would not rescuereligious adherents from the legal obligation to comply.   Smith of course bears heavily on thequestion of exemption of religious institutions from the regulatory regime associated withhistoric preservation laws, but does not speak to the issue of the constitutionality of historicpreservation grants to such institutions.The third, and for our purposes most relevant, shift in the direction of Neutralism arisesfrom recent cases involving government assistance to private schools, including sectarian ones.  
35 521 U.S. 203 (1997), overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)..
36 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
37 Perhaps because public employees were doing the teaching, the Court in Agostini wasnot concerned that the remedial program supported sectarian instruction, though the remedialprogram indeed benefitted schools that seemed to fit earlier descriptions of “pervasively sectarianinstitutions.”
38 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at xxx (plurality opinion).12
In Agostini v. Felton,35 decided in 1997, and in Mitchell v. Helms,36 decided in 2000, theSupreme Court effectively repudiated the concept that all assistance to “pervasively sectarian”institutions was constitutionally forbidden.  Agostini upheld the inclusion of sectarian schools ina federal program which provided remedial instruction, by teachers who are public employees, tostudents attending schools in educationally deprived areas.37   Mitchell, which also involved areligion-neutral federal program, upheld the transfer of educational materials and equipment,including computer hardware and software, to sectarian schools.  In both Agostini and Mitchell,the statute required that the goods and services transferred be limited to those of a secularcharacter.  The Court plurality in Mitchell went furthest in its rejection of the doctrinal trappings andunderlying premises of Separationism.  It explicitly discarded the notion of “pervasivesectarianism,”38 condemning it as anti-Catholic in its origins, disturbing in the incentives itcreated for religious entities to dilute their faith, and unconstitutionally intrusive in the structureof adjudication it produced.   Moreover, the Mitchell plurality made the full plunge towardEstablishment Clause Neutralism in cases in which government transfers are challenged; so longas the category of aided institutions is religion-neutral, and the aided program does not result inreligious indoctrination for which government is responsible, the Mitchell plurality would permittransfers to a broad category of nonprofit institutions, including the most sectarian among them. 
39 Agostini, 521 U.S. at xx (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Stevens, JJ., dissenting);Mitchell, 530 U.S. at xx (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
40 The difficult question, of course, is how to distinguish and segregate religious fromsecular uses when the two are intertwined. Consider, for example, a class focused on readingskills that uses the Bible as its text.  May the government regard that activity as secular, and payfor the Bibles and/or the costs of labor engaged in the instruction? 13
One would think, therefore, that those in the Mitchell plurality would approve of historicpreservation grants to houses of worship, so long as those eligible for grants were a larger,religion-neutral set of landmarked properties. The Mitchell plurality drew the votes of four Justices.  Three other members of the Courtadhered to traditional Separationist views, and dissented in both cases, on the grounds that theaid schemes advanced religion, entangled the government with religion, or both.39  JusticeO’Connor and Justice Breyer, however, concurring in Mitchell,  took the view that neither thestrong Neutralist view nor the strong Separationist view were constitutionally sound.  TheO’Connor-Breyer opinion did not defend the doctrine which excluded “pervasively sectarian”entities from state assistance, and in any event the results in Mitchell and Agostini cannot besquared with that doctrine.  On the more refined question of precisely what sort of aid tosectarian entities is permissible, however, the O’Connor-Breyer view is that the Constitutionforbids the use of such aid for religious instruction or activity.40The O’Connor-Breyer approach, which permits aid to thoroughly sectarian institutionsbut not to their sectarian activities, for the moment controls the outcome in the Supreme Court. However plausible or correct their concurrence may be for programs of aid to sectarian schools,their view represents an incomplete shift from the paradigm of Separationism to that ofNeutrality.  Religious instruction, alone among subjects of pedagogy, remains off limits togovernment support.  This rule, in turn, raises very difficult questions when the state assistance
41The recent announcement by Secretary Martinez of the U.S. Department of Housing andUrban Development that HUD is now willing to finance physical improvements of structures inwhich religious worship may accompany social services highlights the crucial relevance of thequestions we address for charitable choice policy as well for issues of historic preservation.  SeeAssociated Press, Shelter told it can seek grant without dropping prayer, March 15, 2002(describing a statement from Secretary Martinez that city officials may consider giving afederally financed community development grant for new doors, windows, and a new floor, to St.Francis House, a homeless shelter owned by the Catholic Diocese of Sioux Falls, SD, despite thefact that prayers are offered before the evening meal in the shelter)(AP J8542 rn sdsd-SD-Homeless-Grant, Bjt, 0429) (copy on file with the authors); see also Tamara Lytle, MartinezBacks Homeless Shelter’s Mealtime Prayers, The Orlando Sentinel, March 16, 2002, p. A1. 
42The uncertainty inherent in the O’Connor-Breyer approach surfaces in two recentdecisions, Steele v. Industrial Development Board (117 F.Supp.2d 693 (2000)) and VirginiaCollege Building Authority v. Lynn (260 Va. 608, 538 S.E.2d 682 (2000)). Both cases involvedthe use of state revenue bonds to finance the construction of buildings owned by religiousinstitutions, David Lipscomb University in Steele, and Regent University in Lynn.  The financingschemes challenged in these two cases were indistinguishable from the one at issue in Hunt v.McNair (413 U.S. 734 (1973)); what differed was the nature of the universities benefitted by theprogram.  In Steele and Lynn, each court found that the university in question was “pervasivelysectarian” (Steele, 117 F.Supp.2d at 706-716; Lynn, 260 Va. at 623-24, 636-637).  Both courtswent on to say, however, that under Agostini, Mitchell, and other recent Supreme Court decisionsthe “pervasively sectarian” label proves neither dispositive nor irrelevant.  The O’Connor-Breyerapproach requires a closer analysis of the uses of the tax-supported funds (Steele, 117 F.Supp.2dat 706-07, 721-730; Lynn, 260 Va. at 637-639).Despite this shared framework, the Steele and Lynn cases demonstrate the wide range ofinterpretations possible under the O’Connor-Breyer approach.  In Steele, the court found thatrecent Establishment Clause decisions by the Supreme Court still require the presence of“safeguards implemented to ensure that the aid will support only the secular functions of theinstitutions” (Steele, 117 F.Supp.2d at 705).  Although the loan agreement between LipscombUniversity and the Industrial Development Board prohibited the University from using structuresbuilt with loan proceeds for sectarian worship or instruction (Id. at 727), this contractual14
takes the form of payment for bricks and mortar, or any other good which cannot be segregatedinto religious and secular components.41  May the state pay for the pro rata secular share of abuilding used for both secular and sectarian purposes?  If not, should the question be framed interms of the building’s primary use?  Or should religious uses that fairly could be called deminimis disqualify a structure from any and all government assistance in its maintenance andpreservation?   The shift, led by Justices O’Connor and Breyer, from an institutional focus to amore surgically precise activity-based focus, leaves such questions unanswered.42
limitation fell short of minimum constitutional requirements in two ways.  First, the Boarddelegated its enforcement power -- and the monitoring function presupposed by the enforcementpower -- to the bank that provided the source of Lipscomb’s loans, and then made exercise ofthat power discretionary (Id. at 728-729).  Second, the actual use of loan funds indicated no effortto segregate their use from sectarian instruction.  The loan proceeds were used to build andfurnish a library dominated by religious literature, with a collection that focused heavily on theuniversity’s denomination.  While the court found that the proportionate emphasis of the libraryitself suggested a failure to ensure the expenditure of funds on non-sectarian purposes, theproblem was compounded by the availability of loan funds to purchase texts, including religiousmaterials, for the library (Id. at 729-731).  Because the Industrial Development Board failed toensure that tax-supported funds would be used only for secular purposes, the court enjoined anyfurther loans to Lipscomb University (Id. at 734-735).In Lynn, however, the Virginia Supreme Court emphasized a different element of theO’Connor-Breyer approach, the status of “genuinely independent choices” of private actors inbreaking the link between state programs and religious activities.  Where government fundsreach religious entities through free private choices, “endorsement of the religious message isreasonably attributed to the individuals who select the path of the aid,” not the government(Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. at 2559 (O’Connor, J. concurring), quoted in Virginia CollegeBuilding Authority v. Lynn, 260 Va. 608, 639).  Because the benefit of the bond programdepended entirely on the decision of individual investors to purchase Regent University’s bonds,and the bond program was available to a wide range of non-profit educational institutions, theLynn court found no constitutional violation in a pervasively sectarian institution’s participationin such a financing scheme (Lynn, 260 Va. at 638-639).  The court went on to say, however, thatRegent’s proposed use of the bond funds for its Divinity School was impermissible, but notbecause of the Establishment Clause.  Instead, such financing would violate the terms of theVirginia Educational Facilities Authority Act and the Virginia Constitution’s Education Clause(Id. at 640).  
43Much of our argument in Distinctive Place, note 7 supra, is devoted to exposing theinadequacies of asymmetrical versions of Separationism and Neutralism, and to explaining why15
As suggested by the inclusion of equal access claims, Free Exercise developments, andEstablishment Clause decisions in our discussion of the trend from Separationism towardNeutralism, this movement is not narrowly clause-bound.  These developments extend to mattersinvolving state-imposed burdens upon religion as well as state-conferred benefits upon it; assuch, they highlight the theme of symmetry between the Religion Clauses as a necessary elementof any viable theory of religion’s constitutional status.  Full-fledged Neutralism, like someaggressive versions of Separationism, is indeed symmetrical, but both are marred byoverstatement.43  Strong Separationism treats virtually all matters pertaining to state interaction
symmetrical but overly muscular accounts of Separationism and Neutralism are unwise.
44See id. at 83-84.  See also Carl Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-AidSeparationism and the Establishment Clause, XIII Notre Dame J. of Law, Ethics, & Pub. Pol.285, 292-300, 304-311 (1999) (analyzing the Establishment Clause as a restriction ongovernment intrusion into “inherently religious matters.”)
45 For additional elaboration of the jurisdictional character of the Religion Clauses, seeCarl Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint: Validations and Ramifications, in Symposium, The End of Separatism, xx J. of Law & Politics xx (forthcoming 2002). 16
with religion as constitutionally distinctive, while strong Neutralism tries to eradicate the legaldistinctiveness of all such matters.  In our view, the constitutionally distinctive character of religion is real but limited, andderives from a theory of the secular state.  The Religion Clauses mark a jurisdictional limitationon state power.  The government is limited to temporal matters and may not intrude or otherwiseassert its interest in the realm of the sacred,44 a realm that includes worship practices. Government should not author, coerce, regulate, promote, or subsidize worship.  Armed with this substantive view of the boundary of state competence, we stronglybelieve that it should be applied symmetrically to both the Free Exercise Clause and theEstablishment Clause.  What the government may not regulate, it may not support financially,because financial support inevitably involves some measure of regulatory control.  That thecontrol accompanying state financial assistance may be seen as “voluntary” from the perspectiveof religious institutions should not alter the constitutionally required outcome.  Because theboundaries required by the  Establishment Clause are jurisdictional, not “rights-based,” partiescannot waive them or in any other way consent to their removal.45Symmetry of course works in both directions, defining the scope of the permissible aswell as the forbidden.  What the government may regulate, it may also subsidize.  The precisecontent of the boundary between the secular, which should be open to both regulation and
46At the federal level, comprehensive efforts to preserve historic structures andneighborhoods trace back to the National Historic Preservation Act, enacted in 1966, 16 U.S.C. §470 et. seq.  The Act established the National Register of Historic Places and created amechanism for awarding grants to owners of historic properties and to state historic preservationoffices.   The Act did not, however, provide a legal basis for “landmarking” historic propertieswithout their owners’ consent.  A number of states and localities, however, enacted more robustlandmark statutes and ordinances, which permitted historic designation and regulation ofproperties even if owners of such properties objected.  See generally, Daniel R. Mandelker, LandUse Law, §§ 11.22-11.34 (3rd ed. 1993).  In Penn Central Transport. v. City of New York, 438U.S. 104 (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a common version of these landmarkordinances against the owner’s challenge under the Constitution’s Takings Clause.17
support, and the religiously distinctive, which should be open to neither, must be worked out inparticular legal contexts.  The remainder of this piece seeks to illuminate that process of analysisand judgment in the context of historic preservation of houses of worship. III. Historic Preservation of Religious Structures The concepts of jurisdictional limitation and Religion Clause symmetry, developed at theend of Part II, will facilitate the discussion of the constitutional appropriateness of governmentgrants for the historic preservation of houses of worship.  In this Part III, we describe the extentto which houses of worship are exempt from the regulatory regimes which control landmarkedstructures, and proceed through a dramatic juxtaposition of dueling opinion letters fromprominent public officials on the subject of preservation grants to houses of worship.  We thendescribe the surprising array of policies and practices of governments, federal and state, withrespect to such grants.  We conclude in Part IV with suggestions about where to draw asubstantively sound and Clause-symmetrical boundary between permissible and impermissiblestate involvement in the historic preservation of houses of worship. A.  The Problem of RegulationUnsurprisingly, the process of government-mandated historic preservation of structuresand neighborhoods has attracted a substantial amount of attention,46 especially as applied to
47 City of Boerne v. Archbishop Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  For discussion of theBoerne problem, see Colin Black, Comment, The Free Exercise Clause and Historic PreservationLaw: Suggestions for a More Coherent Free Exercise Analysis, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1767 (1998);Elizabeth C. Williamson, City of Boerne v. Flores and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act:The Delicate Balance Between Religious Freedom and Historic Preservation, 13 J. Land Use andEnvtl. L. 107 (1997).
48 See, e.g., St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (1990). Forcommentary on the St. Bartholomew’s decision, see Alan C. Weinstein, The Myth of Ministry vs.Mortar: A Legal and Policy Analysis of Landmark Designation of Religious Institutions, 65Temp. L. Rev. 91 (1992). 
49 The possibility of liturgically-motivated alteration of the exterior of a house of worshipis contemplated in the ordinance from which such structures were held exempt in First CovenantChurch v. Seattle, 840 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1992). 
50 See Society of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Commission, 409 Mass.38, 564 N.E.2d 571 (1990).  For commentary inspired in part by this decision, see AngelaCarmella, Houses of Worship and Religious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to LandmarkPreservation and Architectural Review, 36 Vill. L. Rev. 401 (1991). 
51 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 18
structures owned by religious entities and used for worship.  The process may be coercive, cancreate significant financial hardship, and, in the case of houses of worship, can limit the freedomof a religious community to expand its capability to hold worshipers;47 alter its structure foreconomic,48 aesthetic, or liturgical49 reasons; or, in the most extreme case, reconfigure its interiorworship space.50  Courts have varied widely in their approaches to the questions raised by application ofhistoric preservation ordinances to religious properties, and the issues have been complicatedsignificantly by the decision in Smith,51 the enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration
52 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.  See Keeler v. Mayor andCity Council of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996) (holding that RFRA isunconstitutional, and thus offers church no defense to landmark ordinance, but that application oflandmark ordinance to the church still violated the church’s free exercise of religion, because thelandmark ordinance was not a “neutral law of general applicability.”)  Id. at 885-86.
53 City of Boerne v. Archbishop Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding RFRA invalid asapplied to the states).
54 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
55Cal. Government Code, sec. 25373(d).  The exemption is not self-executing; in order toclaim it, a religious corporation must object to the application of the landmarking law to itsproperty, and “determine in a public forum that it will suffer substantial hardship [defined in thesection] if the [landmarking designation] is approved.”  Id. at sec. 25373(d)(2).   The “publicforum” referenced in the section is simply a meeting open to the public, not a review of theexemption by a public body.  For commentary on the California legislation, see MadeleineRandal, Comment, Holy War: In the Name of Religious Freedom, California Exempts Churchesfrom Historic Preservation, 37 Santa Clara L. Rev. 213 (1996); Felipe M. Nunez & Eric Sidman,California’s Statutory Exemption for Religious Properties from Landmark Ordinances: A19
Act,52 its partial invalidation in City of Boerne,53 and the subsequent enactment of the ReligiousLand Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.54  In this space we can do more than summarize themajor trends over the question of exemption from historic preservation ordinances for propertydevoted to religious uses.   We believe, however, that a principled approach to the ReligionClauses requires symmetry between the Free Exercise question of exemption and theEstablishment Clause question of disability to receive government support.  Uncertainty withrespect to the exemption question is, in our view, bound to give rise to corresponding uncertaintyon the question of the permissibility of the grants.For purposes of this paper, we think it will be most useful to categorize the existingapproaches to exemption of religious institutions into four discrete models.  The first, andbroadest model, is that found in the California legislative exemption.   By statute, Californiaexempts all noncommercial property owned by religious corporations from the authority of localgovernment to designate properties as historical landmarks.55  In East Bay Asian Local
Constitutional and Policy Analysis, 12 J. L. & Religion 271 (1995-96).
56 13 P.3d 1122 (Ca. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1735 (2001).
57 We discuss the California exemption, and its validation in East Bay, extensively inLupu & Tuttle, Distinctive Place, note 7 supra, passim.  We conclude that the exemption is notrequired by any sensible rendering of Separationist principle, and that it is far too great adeparture from Neutralism to be sustained.  Id. at 74-76.
58 840 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1992). 
59 First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352 (1990).
60 499 U.S. 901 (1991).
61 494 U.S. at xxx. 20
Development Corp. v. California,56 the California Supreme Court upheld the statutory exemptionagainst claims that it violated the California Constitution or the Establishment Clause of thefederal constitution.  The Court did not go so far as to claim that an exemption this broad wasconstitutionally required; instead, it recognized that the state legislature had discretion toconclude that religious corporations would be significantly burdened by the landmarking of anyof their noncommercial property, and therefore to accommodate them in this way.57   The second model of exemption for religious structures from landmarking regimes isexemplified by the decision of the Washington Supreme Court in First Covenant Church v.Seattle.58  The Court in an earlier decision had ruled that the federal Free Exercise Clauserequired all houses of worship to be exempt from such laws.59  After the U.S. Supreme Courtvacated and remanded the decision in light of Employment Division v. Smith,60 the WashingtonSupreme Court reaffirmed its original result, resting its conclusions both on the  “hybrid rights”theory discussed in Smith61 and on the state constitution.  Thus, under First Covenant, “houses ofworship” are entirely exempt from landmark designation, though other property owned by
62 It is unclear whether the exemption is limited to properties used exclusively orprimarily for worship purposes, or whether it might extend to residential properties usedoccasionally for worship.  The rationale of First Covenant, which rests heavily on the values ofreligious expression associated with design of houses of worship, would suggest that places usedonly occasionally for worship would not qualify. 
63 409 Mass. 38, 564 N.E.2d 571 (1990). 
64 564 N.E. 2d at 572.
65 Id. at 573 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 783, 784 (1955)).
66 Id. at 573.
67 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990). 21
religious institutions, even if put to religious uses, presumably is not.62A third possible model of exemption is suggested by the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Commission.63  TheCommission had designated as a landmark elements of the interior of The Church of theImmaculate Conception in South Boston.  As the Court described it, “[t]he designation restricted permanent alteration of the “nave, chancel, vestibule and organ loft on the main floor – thevolume, window glazing, architectural detail, finishes, painting, the organ, and organ case.”64 Relying exclusively on the state constitution, the Court distinguished an earlier ruling in which ithad approved of landmark designation of the exteriors of churches to the extent they were “opento view from a public way.”65  Landmarking of an interior space, the Court concluded, “issubstantially more invasive, reaching into the church’s actual worship space.”66The final model is one of no exemption at all.  This is exemplified by the decision of theU.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rector of St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City ofNew York.67  The St. Bartholomew’s decision involved an attempt by church officials to escape alandmark designation in order to demolish what the court described as an “auxiliary structure
68 Id. at 350.
69 Id. at 354.  The Court also relied on the fact that the major burden on the Church wasfinancial, rather an interference with its religious practice.  Id. at 354-55.  It therefore left openthe possibility that a landmarking of worship premises that did so interfere might produce adifferent result, but it did not explain how or why, in light of Smith, such facts would produce adifferent result.  Smith itself involved a worship practice, the use of peyote by Native AmericanChurch members, and nothing in the Smith opinion suggests that the character of the regulated practice will have any bearing upon application of the rule that the Smith Court announced.
70 Such a grant would be barred by the state constitution in California, see Frohliger vRichardson, 63 Cal. App. 209, 218 P 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1923), although other stateswith less absolute barriers to such grants might adopt the California model of deregulation ofproperty owned by religious entities. 22
next to the Church’s main house of worship.”68  The church wanted to tear down this building,which housed a variety of church activities including some of a decidedly religious character, andreplace it with a high-rise office tower that would include both church uses and income-producing office space.  In denying the church the right to escape the landmark designation onfree exercise grounds, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the then quite recent decision inSmith.   The Landmarks Law in New York City, the court concluded, is a religion-neutral law ofgeneral applicability, and the Free Exercise Clause does not support claims of exemption fromsuch regulatory regimes.69All four models of exemption present different issues for those who wrestle withquestions of the permissibility of preservation grants.  The California model appears to excludeall regulation of religious property, but the scheme involves self-designation.   Presumably, areligious corporation could assent to landmarking, and then seek a preservation grant.70   TheFirst Covenant model excludes all houses of worship from landmarking designation, but here tooit is not clear if religious entities may, as in California, consent to the designation and seek agrant to aid in preservation.  The rule in the Society of Jesus decision is limited to churchinteriors, and expressly reaffirms the possibility of designation of the exteriors of houses of
71 Our own view, expressed in Distinctive Places, note 7 supra, at 88-90, is that FirstCovenant goes too far, and Society of Jesus gets the matter right.  Houses of worship should havethe same rights as other nonprofit associations (but no more) to complain, on the religion-neutralground of compelled speech, about exterior designations.  Interior designations, on the otherhand, may press into worship space so deeply that we think they are beyond the state’sjurisdiction altogether, so that landmark designations of interiors should not be permitted with orwithout the church’s consent. 23
worship.  Once again, however, the exemption for interiors seems permissive, not mandatory;houses of worship are not obliged to claim it.71  And the analysis in St. Bartholomew’s Churchsuggests no room for exemptions at all; from the decision’s general character, and its reliance onSmith, one might fairly presume that houses of worship, interiors as well as exteriors, are (as amatter of federal law) fair game for landmark designation in the Second Circuit.  In such ajurisdiction, the question of whether preservation grants are permissible in any  case, involvingbuildings devoted to worship, seems particularly pressing.  B.  The Problem of Historic Preservation Grants 1.  The Dueling Opinion LettersWhatever the outcome on the regulatory side, has the movement toward Neutralismmoved far enough to encompass state grants to religious groups for the preservation and upkeepof historic structures in which religious worship still occurs?   That is, in those states whichrecognize no exemption from landmarking for structures devoted to worship, or an interiorexemption only, may the preservation of such structures be supported financially by the state? In the late 1980's, John Shannahan, the Director of the Connecticut HistoricalCommission, was in a quandary over this precise question.  The Commission had authority tomake grants for the purpose of preserving historic buildings in Connecticut, and many of thebuildings of historic character in the state were churches.  Various towns and cities inConnecticut had landmarked their historic churches, and a number of these churches had applied
72 Letter from Attorney General Joseph I. Lieberman, to John Shannahan, Director,Connecticut Historical Commission, July 5, 1988 (hereafter “Lieberman Letter”) (copy on filewith the authors and the Boston College Law Review). 
73 Id. at 4, n. 1 (citing a memorandum written in 1982 from Ralph W. Tarr, DeputyAssistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to William H.Coldiron, Solicitor of the Interior, U.S. Department of the Interior, and another written in 1979by James D. Webb, Associate Solicitor, Conservation and Wildlife, U.S. Department of theInterior). 24
to the state historical commission for preservation grants.  The Director was quite unsure,however, whether the Religion Clauses of the state or federal constitution would permit a grant toreligious groups which controlled such buildings, or (regardless of who controlled the building) agrant to preserve a structure with religious use and/or significance.  The Director decided to askfor a legal opinion from the chief lawyer of the Executive Branch of the State of Connecticut –Joseph I. Lieberman, then Attorney General of the State.In a letter dated July 5, 1988, Attorney General Lieberman provided his opinion.72  Aftersurveying what he deemed the relevant Connecticut and federal precedents on the subject,including a pair of relatively recent memoranda by federal agency lawyers who asserted thathistoric preservation grants to religious institutions were constitutionally questionable,73Lieberman concluded that such grants were indeed permissible in a variety of circumstances.  Inhis view, these grants served legitimate purposes in the preservation of historical structures in thestate, they advanced religion only incidentally, they would not entangle the granting agency inreligious affairs, and they would not be perceived as state endorsement of religion.  AttorneyGeneral Lieberman distinguished the Nyquist decision in three ways.   First, he noted that the“maintenance and repair” grants in Nyquist left a substantial amount of discretion in the privateinstitutions to decide how to allocate the funds; historic preservation grants are much more
74 Lieberman letter, note 72 supra, at 9.
75 Id. 
76 Id. (“Not only was the Nyquist Court concerned that the subject aid would be massivein absolute terms, but also that it might have a ‘massive’ proportionate effect on such schools,making it possible for them to obtain their ‘entire maintenance and repair budgets’ from statetax-raised funds.”) (citing Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774).
77 Memorandum for John Leshy, Solicitor, United States Department of Interior, fromWalter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department ofJustice, Re: Historic Preservation Grants to Religious Properties, dated October 31, 1995, at 7(hereafter cited as  “Dellinger Memorandum”) (copy on file with the authors and the BostonCollege Law Review) (http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/doi.24.htm).25
precisely targeted.74  Second, the grants in Nyquist went to a group of institutions dominatednumerically by Roman Catholic schools; the Connecticut grants went to a far wider and morereligiously pluralistic group of sects.75  Third, the grants disapproved in Nyquist paid asubstantial portion of the maintenance budget of sectarian schools; by contrast, the historicpreservation grants tended to be significantly smaller, both in absolute terms and as a percentageof total preservation costs.76Seven years later, in 1995, a federal agency renewed the question that Attorney GeneralLieberman had answered for Director Shannahan.  The Solicitor of the United States Departmentof the Interior, John Leshy, had drafted an opinion on the subject of “Historic PreservationGrants for Religious Properties “ for the Director of the National Park Service, Roger Kennedy. Leshy presented the draft opinion, which suggested that intervening changes in constitutional lawmight have removed the legal impediments to such grants, to Walter Dellinger, who was then theAssistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice.  Aftersurveying a number of the same precedents as the Lieberman letter had discussed, including inparticular Nyquist and Tilton, and qualifying his conclusion with defensive assertions that the“question of government aid to religious institutions is . . . difficult . . .,”77 and “the Supreme
78 Id. at 8.
79 Id.  The Dellinger memorandum also considered briefly the question whether the FreeExercise Clause limited the government in landmarking religious buildings in the first place.Although pretending not to take a position on the issue, the letter betrayed its author’sSeparationist leanings – also suggested by its conclusion on the question of grants – by assertingthat the reasoning of the most prominent decision exempting religious houses of worship fromlandmarking laws  “is persuasive.”  Id. at 5-6 (citing First Covenant, and distinguishing St.Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S.905 (1991)). 
80 See text at notes 82-93, infra.  26
Court’s jurisprudence in this area is still developing,”78 Dellinger’s memorandum expresses theultimate judgment “that a court applying current precedent is most likely to conclude that thedirect award of historic preservation grants to churches and other pervasively sectarianinstitutions violates the Establishment Clause.”79   The Dellinger memorandum remains thepolicy of the federal government with respect to expenditures for the upkeep of buildingsdevoted to worship.80 Did then-Attorney General Lieberman have the better view in 1988 than then-Assistant Attorney General Dellinger in 1995?   The Lieberman Letter tilts heavily toward Neutralism, which had displaced Separationism to some extent by 1988, and to an even greater extent by1995, when Dellinger wrote.  Moreover, decisions rendered since 1995 have to a considerableextent reduced the force of Separationism still further, especially in cases involving governmentfinancial support that benefits religious institutions along with a broad mix of secular entities.   If Lieberman was right in 1988, his view must be even more correct today.   And yet, as noted inPart II above, the shift to Neutrality and away from Separationism is incomplete.   Can one fairlysay, as Lieberman did in 1988, that historic preservation grants are so different from the“maintenance and repair” grants struck down in Nyquist that the shift toward Neutrality issufficient to validate grants targeted at historic preservation of structures currently devoted to
81 There are a range of nongovernmental funding sources for preservation of houses ofworship.  For more information on such sources, see the website of Partners for Sacred Places,  
82The National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470.  Implementing regulations forthe Act can be found at 36 CFR parts 60-63, 65-68.  Further information about federal programsfor historic preservation can be found on the website of the National Park Service,http://www.cr.nps.gov.  See also Cohen, supra note 5 (describing federal historic preservationprograms). 27
worship?  Indeed, if Lieberman is correct about preservation grants, involving houses of worship,one would think that Nyquist, involving sectarian school buildings, should be overruled.This is obviously an unfinished story.  For its latest chapters, we turn to policiesarticulated, and practices engaged in, concerning historic preservation grants by those on thefront line of administration.   As the tale unfolds, its lessons suggest significant – and perhapsappropriate – hesitation about the shift from Separationism to Neutralism. 2. Current Policy and PracticeSupport for historic preservation is available from the federal government and manystates, and takes a variety of forms.81  Beyond the official recognition that comes with listing aproperty in the National Register of Historic Places or a state’s register, owners of historicproperties may also receive technical assistance, tax incentives, low-interest loans, and grants toassist them in restoring and preserving the structure.  In examining the constitutionalimplications of providing such assistance to religious institutions, we will focus on public grants. We look first at the federal programs that provide such grants, and then turn to state programs.A.  Federal Historic Preservation GrantsThe National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), enacted in 1966, provides the criteria fordetermining which properties are eligible to be listed in the National Register, and alsoempowers the Department of the Interior to make grants – either directly or through a statehistoric preservation office – to subsidize preservation and restoration of listed properties.82  The
8336 CFR § 60.4 (a).
84 E-mail from Patrick Andrus, Historian, National Register of Historic Places, to JoannCorey, July 19, 2001 (copy on file with the authors and the Boston College Law Review).
85Letter to the Honorable James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior, from Frederick N.Khedouri, Associate Director, Office of Management and Budget (Dec 14, 1981) (referenced inDellinger Memorandum and in Lieberman letter).
8616 USC § 470(e)(4). 28
regulations permit “properties owned by religious institutions or used for religious purposes” tobe listed in the National Register only if the properties “deriv[e] primary significance fromarchitectural or artistic distinction or historical importance,”83 and not because of the structures’religious significance.  At present, several thousand properties owned by religious institutionsand actively used for religious purposes are listed on the National Register.84At least since the early 1980s, the federal government has followed a Separationist policyregarding historic preservation grants to religious institutions.85  Concerns about violating theEstablishment Clause led the federal government to deem such properties ineligible for anyprogram that provides grants for “bricks and mortar.”  Reacting against this policy, Congressamended the NHPA in 1992 to authorize preservation grants to religious properties:[G]rants may be made under this subsection for the preservation, stabilization,restoration, or rehabilitation of religious properties listed in the National Registerof Historic Places, provided that the purpose of the grant is secular, does notpromote religion, and seeks to protect those qualities that are historicallysignificant.86Congress’s directive, however, did not change the policy of the Justice Department or thepractice of the federal agencies; both policy and practice remained fundamentally Separationist. Citing the Dellinger memorandum, the National Parks Service’s Historic Preservation FundsGrants Manual bars grants for “construction repair costs, or real property acquisition costs”
87Historic Preservation Funds Grants Manual, Chapter 6, E(4) (October 1997).
88Save America’s Treasures, FY 2002 Historic Preservation Fund Grant ApplicationForm, http://www2.cr.nps.gov/treasures/2002SATpackage.pdf (on file with the authors), at p.2.See also letter from Robert Stanton, Director, National Park Service to Senator Slade Gorton(Feb. 4, 2000) (explaining that because of the Justice Department’s interpretation of theEstablishment Clause, the Park Service cannot spend the $151,000 earmarked in Public Law106-113, under the Save America’s Treasures program, for the historic preservation of St.Nicholas Greek Orthodox Cathedral in Tarpon Springs, Florida) (copy on file with the authorsand the Boston College Law Review).
89In addition to programs discussed in this paragraph, Separationist policy is also visible in the following federal programs administered by the Department of Housing and UrbanDevelopment that provide grants for preservation, restoration, or construction: the HomeInvestment Partnerships Program, 24 CFR § 92.257 (barring religious organizations fromparticipating in program that provides federal money to rehabilitate or construct low-incomehousing); Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS, 24 CFR § 574.300(c)(2) (restrictions onuse of program funds for rehabilitation or conversion of structures owned by religiousorganizations); the Emergency Shelter Grants Program, 24 CFR § 576.23(b) (restrictions ongrants to convert or rehabilitate structures owned by religious organizations); the SupportiveHousing Program, 24 CFR § 583.150 (restrictions on participation of religious institutions onprogram of housing and services for the homeless).
9024 CFR § 570.208. 29
related to historic properties owned by religious institutions.87  The “Save America’s Treasures”program, administered jointly by the National Park Service and the National Trust for HistoricPreservation, contains a similar prohibition on funding “Historic properties and collectionsassociated with an active religious organization (for example, restoration of an historic churchthat is still actively used as a church).”88The Separationist policy reflected in the Dellinger memorandum extends to other federalprograms that provide grants for “bricks and mortar.”89  The Department of Housing and UrbanDevelopment’s Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program authorizes theDepartment to make grants for preservation and reconstruction of structures serving a widevariety of purposes in a community, benefitting both commercial and non-profit institutions.90 The CDBG program, however, imposes strict restrictions on any funding used to rehabilitate
9124 CFR § 570.200 (j).
9244 CFR § 206.221(e) (definition of “non-profit facilities” eligible for public disasterassistance grants); 44 CFR § 206.222 (providing that non-profit facilities, along with state andlocal governments and indian tribes, are eligible to receive public disaster assistance grants).
9344 CFR § 206.221(e)(1) (category of educational facility eligible for disaster assistancegrant “does not include buildings, structures, and related items used primarily for religiouspurposes or instruction”); FEMA Response and Recovery Directorate Policy Number 9521.1(www.fema.gov/r-n-r/pa/9521_1.htm) (defining “community center” in 44 CFR § 206.221(e)(6)to exclude “Facilities established or primarily used for religious -- or similar -- activities”).
94See, for example, the recent announcement that HUD will permit the use of grantmoney for maintenance and repair of structures owned by religious institutions.  See supra note41.
95Physical Disaster Business Loans Program, 13 CFR §123.200.
96For the Flood Mitigation Assistance Program, see 44 CFR §78.12.30
structures owned by religious entities.  In order to receive funding, the structure must be leased toa “wholly secular” entity -- for no more than the fair market value of the property before thefunded rehabilitation -- and used only for secular purposes.91  Similarly, the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA) provides Federal Disaster Assistance grants to a broad variety of“non-profit facilities” that provide basic services to the general public, including schools,museums, community centers, and libraries.92  The category of non-profit facilities eligible forFEMA disaster assistance grants specifically excludes facilities used for religious purposes.93Despite this rather consistent Separationism, a closer look at federal programs thatprovide grants for “bricks and mortar” reveals a somewhat more complicated picture.94 Religious properties affected by disasters are eligible for low-interest loans through a programadministered by the Small Business Administration;95 and may receive FEMA Hazard MitigationGrants as part of a community-wide mitigation project.96  Indeed, FEMA’s website celebrates thefinancial support its Hazard Mitigation Grants program provided to relocate a church out of a
97“A Church Gets Moved Out of Harm's Way in Pennsylvania,”  (www.fema.gov/nwz00/nwz00_22.htm).
98The Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-155, 110 Stat. 1392 (1996)(Section 4 creates the Loan Guarantee Recovery Fund).  See also the Department of Housing andUrban Development regulations governing the loan fund established by the Church ArsonPrevention Act, 24 CFR § 573.  Professor Esbeck collects these and other examples of the trendaway from Separationism in Carl Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-AidSeparationism and the Establishment Clause, 13 Notre Dame J. L., Ethics, & Pub. Pol’y 285,285-6 & n.4 (1999)
99 See Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment is Not Establishment, 13 Notre Dame J. of  L.,Ethics, & Pub. Pol. 341, 354, n.22 (1999). 
100104 PL 19 (141 Cong. Rec. H 6607, *6636).  See also statements of Rep. Istook:Mr. Speaker, Congress is aware that several downtown churches wereseverely damaged as a result of the April 19, 1995, terrorist bombing of the AlfredP. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Among these are First UnitedMethodist Church, First Baptist Church, St. Paul's Episcopal Cathedral and St.Joseph's Catholic Church. These churches assisted in the emergency relief effortimmediately after the bombing and one was even used as a temporary morgue forvictims of the blast.These religious institutions have been informed by the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency that under current regulations they are not eligible for anyfederal disaster assistance for the repair and reconstruction of their facilities.However, Congress recognizes that the Oklahoma City bombing is a unique case.31
flood plain.97  In addition, the Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996 provides low-incomereconstruction loans to any non-profit organization, including religious institutions, victimizedby arson or terrorism motivated by racial or religious animus.98 When several historic churches --and a number of other houses of worship -- were seriously damaged because of the bombing ofthe Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, FEMA and the Department of Housing & UrbanDevelopment initially refused to provide federal aid for their reconstruction.99  The agencies laterrelented when Congress specifically directed that “notwithstanding any other provision of law,such funds may be used for the repair and reconstruction of religious institution facilitiesdamaged by the explosion in the same manner as private nonprofit facilities providing publicservices.”100  Ultimately, Oklahoma City churches received over $6 million in federal funds to
The bombing was a single, man-made assault directed against our nationalgovernment. These churches, like the other businesses and residences in thedamaged area, were innocent bystanders to a violent attack on the federalgovernment. This special instance is therefore distinguished from other kinds ofdisasters in which religious buildings may be damaged. Congress thus agrees thatreligious institutions in Oklahoma City should be eligible for the federalassistance provided in this bill in the same manner as nonprofit organizationsproviding public services.141 Cong. Rec. E 1439 (June 29, 1995).
101 Pat Gilliland, Church Thanks City Council[:] Funds Assist in Restoration, The DailyOklahoman, April 2, 1997, III/1.
102Historic Preservation Fund Grants Manual, Ch. 6 (E)(3) (October 1997).32
help repair damage from the bombing.101Federal historic preservation programs also depart from the robust Separationismarticulated in the Dellinger memorandum.  Although Department of the Interior policies prohibitthe use of federal funds for “development” -- i.e., preservation and renovation -- projectsinvolving historic religious properties, the policies allow grants to such properties for “pre-development” costs.102  “Pre-development” costs include architectural plans for restoration orrenovation of the structure, consulting fees incurred in preparing forms for inclusion in theNational Register of Historic Places,  and other similar expenses.The restoration of Ebenezer Baptist Church, financed by a grant through the “SaveAmerica’s Treasures” program as part of the Martin Luther King, Jr. National Historic Site,provides an illuminating study in the limits of Separationism as an official policy.  Martin LutherKing, Jr. was a co-pastor of Ebenezer Baptist Church during the years of his leadership of thecivil rights movement, and he preached many of his famous sermons on civil rights, racerelations, and civil disobedience from its pulpit.  The congregation of Ebenezer Baptist still ownsthe church property, but leased the historic church to the National Park Service as part of a dealthat provided the congregation with a parcel adjacent to the historic church, on which the
103For descriptions of the agreement between Ebenezer Baptist Church and the NationalPark Service, see Kevin Sack, “A New Place to Nourish One Dreamer’s Legacy,” N.Y. Times,Mar. 8, 1999, at A12, col. 1; Gayle White, “Historic Old Church to Get New Sanctuary,” AtlantaJ. & Const., Mar. 23, 1997, at 5C; “Park Service Takes Over Legacy of Historic EbenezerBaptist,” Atlanta J. & Const., May 1, 1996, at 1B.
104See E.N. Smith, “Park Service Will Preserve Historic King Church; CongregationMoves to Make Room for Progress,” Chattanooga Times/Chattanooga Free Press, Feb. 20, 1999,at F1 (“A 99-year lease will enable the Park Service to offer tours, lectures, book signings andother programs, including live choral performances at the historic church.  However, members ofthe congregation will still be allowed to celebrate special occasions there”).
105For commentary on the Park Service’s struggles in managing sacred sites, especiallythose of American Indians, see Charles Levendosky, “Respecting Sacred Sites: Why notAccommodate Indians at Devils Tower as we Accommodate Christians Elsewhere?” DenverRocky Mountain News, May 18, 1997, at 1B; Shawna Lee, Note: Government Managed Shrines:Protection of Native American Sacred Site Worship, 35 Val. U.L. Rev. 265 (2000).  See also id.at 306-07 (discussing the Park Service’s agreement with Ebenezer Baptist Church).33
congregation has built a new sanctuary.103  Under the terms of its 99-year lease to operate thechurch as a historic site, the Park Service conducts tours and offers programs open to the public. The congregation of Ebenezer holds its regular services in the new sanctuary but remains free touse the historic church for special worship events, at which times the Park Service closes thechurch to the general public.104  Accurate presentation of Dr. King’s life, not to mention theentire Civil Rights Movement, requires attention to the important role of African-Americanchurches, but a consistent Separationist policy would preclude the close relationship between thePark Service and Ebenezer Baptist Church.105B. State Historic Preservation GrantsTo the extent that State Historic Preservation Offices act merely as conduits of federalfunds, their grants are bound by the Separationist policies reflected in the Dellingermemorandum.  A significant number of states, however, provide additional funds for historicpreservation, and these state programs reflect quite disparate attitudes toward financing religious
106For a survey of state historic preservation grant programs, see state-by-state chartdeveloped by the National Trust, at http://www.nationaltrust.org/help/State_Funding.pdf (on filewith the authors).
107See, e.g., the responses of the Indiana, Montana, and Nevada state historic preservationoffices (email from Jon Smith, Deputy Director, Indiana State Historic Preservation Office, toJoann Corey, July 20, 2001; from Herb Dawson, Deputy Director, Montana State HistoricPreservation Office, to Joann Corey, July 23, 2001; from Alice Baldrica, Nevada State HistoricPreservation Office, to Joann Corey, July 23, 2001) (all linking state limits on grants to religiousinstitutions to federal policies) (copies of all emails to Joann Corey cited herein are on file withthe authors and the Boston College Law Review).  Minnesota declares religious propertiesineligible to receive state historic preservation grants, but does not explain why.  Minnesota StateHistorical Society, State Grants-in-Aid Program Project Guidelines 1 (1998) (website address:www.mnhs.org/about/grants/pdffiles/guidelines.pdf).
108Frohliger v. Richardson, 63 Cal. App. 209, 218 P. 497 (1923).  The CaliforniaConstitution provides that no government entity may “...grant anything to or in aid of anyreligious sect, church, creed, or sectarian purpose.”  63 Cal. App. at 212 (citing CaliforniaConstitution Article IV, Section 30) (the same provision is now located at Article XVI, Section5).  The current picture in California is more complicated than the state constitutional analysis inFrohliger would suggest.  Some “public spaces” in religious properties seem to be eligiblefor state historic preservation grants, though the precise nature of the eligible projects is unclearfrom the grants guidelines, which indicate that the questions will be resolved by the administratoron a case-by-case basis.  See California Office of Historic Preservation, Grant Application34
properties.106  We look first at programs that follow the federal government’s Separationism, andthen at programs that adopt the Neutralism represented by the Lieberman letter.1. Separationist PoliciesOf the state historic preservation programs that share the federal government’sSeparationist policy, which bars most preservation grants to religious properties, some appear todo so because they find the Dellinger memorandum either persuasive or binding.107  Other statesadopt a Separationist policy on particular state law grounds.  In California, state historicpreservation grants to religious organizations appear to be barred by the 1923 decision of thestate’s Court of Appeals in Frohliger v Richardson, which held that a state appropriation forrestoration of the San Diego Mission was barred by the state constitution’s absolute ban onfunding sectarian institutions.108  In Georgia, the state’s Division for Natural Resources recently
and Procedural Guide for the California Heritage Fund Grant Program 1, 12 (2001)(http://ohp.parks.ca.gov/pages/1054/files/nov_01chfgrantapp.pdf).
109“State suspends historic site grants to churches,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution (May25, 2000) 5C. See also email from Cherie Blizzard, Grants Coordinator, Historic PreservationDivision, Georgia Department of Natural Resources, to Joann Corey, July 16, 2001 (citing stateconstitution as the reason the state no “no longer makes historic preservation grant[s] to religiousorganizations”) (copy of the e-mail on file with the authors and the Boston College LawReview).   Georgia’s state constitution provides that: “No money shall ever be taken from thepublic treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, cult, or religious denominationor of any sectarian institution.”  Georgia Const. Art. 1, Sect. 2, Par. 7 (1983).
110See email from Kathleen Kilpatrick, Virginia State Historic Preservation Office, toJoann Corey, July 23, 2001 (describing grant to Christ Church in Lancaster, Va.) (copy on filewith the authors and the Boston College Law Review).   The prohibition on funding propertiesowned by religious organizations is found in Va. Code § 10.1-2213(A)(3).  New York City’sLandmarks Preservation Council’s Historic Preservation Grant Program is funded by a federalCommunity Development Block Grant; to comply with the CDBG restrictions on fundingreligious properties, the Council will only fund religious properties where ownership has beentransferred to a secular non-profit entity which then manages the property, and can lease back aportion to the religious entity for use as worship space.  See email from William Neely, Director,Historic Preservation Grant Program, New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, toJoann Corey, July 17, 2001 (copy on file with the authors and the Boston College Law Review).  
111Because the Establishment Clause binds the states as well as the federal government,the Dellinger memorandum’s interpretation, if correct, should apply to both federal and statefunding streams.  That many states deviate from the memorandum reflects 1) the phenomenon of35
discontinued its practice of awarding historic preservation grants to religious organizationsbecause of concerns that the practice violated the state constitution’s (strongly Separationist)religion clause.109  Virginia also has strict constitutional limits on state grants to religiousorganizations, but allows churches to transfer ownership of the property to a secular non-profitinstitution -- which would be eligible for state historic preservation grants, and would operate thechurch as a historic site open to the public -- and the congregation can then lease the worshipspace back from the secular entity.1102. Neutralist PoliciesMany, and perhaps most, of the states that offer their own historic preservation grants donot share the federal government’s Separationist policies,111 though these states impose a wide
independent voices in constitutional interpretation within the federal system, and 2) substantialuncertainty about the content and path of Establishment Clause principles.
112See, e.g., Lieberman Letter, note 72 supra, at 15 (“Any religious property which is thesubject of a state preservation grant should meet standard criteria for grant-worthiness based onthe property’s intrinsic historical, architectural, or other cultural values”).   See also NationalHistorical Preservation Act (criteria for listing religious property).
113See Guidelines for Preservation Grant Applications, Texas Historical Commission 4(website address for the form: www.thc.state.tx.us/forms/tptf/TPTFGuidelines02.pdf ); GardenState Historic Preservation Trust Fund, 2002 Grant Guidelines 16 (website address for the form:www.njht.org/guidelines-2002.pdf) (New Jersey program does not fund “costs involving theinteriors of buildings used primarily for religious worship or a religious purpose”).  The ArizonaHeritage Preservation Grant Fund (administered by the State Parks Commission) seems to allowgrants to churches for exterior work, though its website indicates that churches are ineligible. See email from Jim Garrison, Arizona State Historic Preservation Office, to Joann Corey, July12, 2001 (“Active churches are eligible for grants so long as the grant is limited to the exterior orclearly architectural elements”) (copy on file with the authors and the Boston College LawReview), see also www.pr.state.az.us/partnerships/grants/histpres.html.  Florida has a similarlimitation: “Grant assistance to projects which serve a religious purpose if restricted to exteriorfeatures or that work which can be viewed from the public right-of-way” (email from Robert C.Taylor, Historic Preservationist Supervisor, Florida Department of State, Division of HistoricalResources, Bureau of Historic Preservation, to Joann Corey, July 16, 2001) (copy on file with theauthors and the Boston College Law Review).  See also Maryland Historical Trust Capital GrantProgram, Fiscal Year 2003 Grant Guidelines 3 (“Structures used for religious purposes may beeligible for MHT grant assistance for exterior work only and will be reviewed by MHT on a caseby case basis”) (www.marylandhistoricaltrust.net/capguide.pdf).36
range of conditions on grants to religious organizations.  One feature shared by all programs thatfinance historic preservation of religious properties -- and indeed by the federal requirements forlisting religious properties in the National Register of Historic Places -- is that the property’ssignificance is determined on secular terms, such as its architectural merit or role in importanthistorical events.112A common condition limits grants to religious institutions to repairs that are publiclyvisible.  Texas and New Jersey, for example, only support work on the exterior of religiousproperties.113  Other jurisdictions, however, permit grants for restoring and preserving the interiorof religious properties, provided that the properties offer the public a reasonable opportunity to
114Colorado State Historical Fund, Grant Program Guidelines 21 (online at website:http://www.coloradohistory-oahp.org/publications/pubs/1412GuidelinesTO.pdf) (hereinafter“Colorado Guidelines”).  See also Lieberman Letter,  note 72 supra, at 15 (“if related work isdone in a [religious] building’s interior, the public must be provided with reasonable opportunityto view the restored structures (as often as possible) during times when no religious service orinstruction is being conducted in the immediate vicinity”).  The Lieberman Letter reflects currentConnecticut practice.  See email from Paul Loether, Connecticut Historical Commission, toJoann Corey, July 13, 2001 (copy on file with the authors and the Boston College Law Review);see also Connecticut Historical Commission, Historic Preservation Fund - Phase II Guidelines,www.chc.state.ct.us/HRF-Phase2.htm);  New York State Office of Parks, Recreation andHistoric Preservation, 9 NYCRR § 432.4(b) (reasonable accessibility requirement for anyhistoric preservation grant made to not-for-profit entity); State of Vermont Historic PreservationGrants Program, email from Eric Gilbertson, Director, Vermont Division for HistoricPreservation, to Joann Corey, July 24, 2001 (“We do not fund strictly religious items or interiorwork on areas not open to the public”) (copy on file with the authors and the Boston College LawReview).
115Cohen, ALI-ABA study, supra note 5, at 7.
116Keystone Historic Preservation Grant Program(www.artsnet.org/phmc/key_guide.html).
117See generally Washington State Office of Archaeology and Historic Preservation,Rehabilitation Grant-in-Aid Program (email from Greg Griffith, Deputy State HistoricPreservation Officer, Washington State Office of Archaeology and Historic Preservation, toJoann Corey, DATE) (“Clearly, we would not and could not fund rehabilitation of elements of37
view the interior “without being required to participate in or witness any religious activities.”114 The New York State historic preservation program requires grantees that use grants for interiorrestoration to open the property “to the general public at least 12 times a year at reasonablyspaced intervals.”115  Pennsylvania requires that the benefitted property “must be open andaccessible to the public on a regular basis, not less than 100 days per year.”116  In requiring publicaccessibility to state-subsidized interior portions of historical structures, these agencies treatreligious institutions no differently than other grantees.Somewhat more complicated are restrictions designed to segregate expenditures withprimarily historical, architectural, or cultural value from benefits that flow primarily to thereligious use of the property. Several states restrict the use of grants for “liturgical items.”117
the church that pertained to the liturgy or aspects that support the service or mission of thechurch”) (copy on file with the authors and the Boston College Law Review); ColoradoGuidelines, supra note 114, at 21-22 (“Grant funds cannot be used to restore religious symbols”);Lieberman Letter, note 72 supra, at 15 (concerns about funding “repair of a ritual object”);Illinois Historic Preservation Agency Grant-in-Aid Program (email from Theodore Hild, Deputy,Illinois State Historic Preservation Office, to Joann Corey, July 24, 2001) (“the grant projectmust be for non-liturgical purposes”) (copy on file with the authors and the Boston College LawReview).
118Colorado Guide, supra note 114, at 22; email from Theodore Hild, supra note 117 (Illinois program).
119Colorado Guide, supra note 114, at 22.
120See email from Theodore Hild, supra note 117 (Illinois program ).
121Massachusetts and Vermont have both funded the preservation of stained-glasswindows.  For Massachusetts, see email from Elsa Fitzgerald, Assistant Director, MassachusettsHistorical Commission, to Joann Corey, August 2, 2001 (copy on file with the authors and theBoston College Law Review).  For Vermont, see email from Eric Gilbertson, supra note 114.
122 Id.
123Terry Colley of the Texas Historical Commission explains: “for example, if a churchwanted to replace an original slate roof with a shingle roof, we would make a grant to help them[use] slate” (email from Terry Colley, Deputy Director, Texas Historical Commission, to JoannCorey, July 24, 2001)(copy on file with the authors and the Boston College Law Review).38
Architectural elements included in this category are “stained glass windows illustrating religiousthemes,”118 “steeple crosses,”119 and altars.120  Other states highlight their funding of such items,however, as central to preserving and restoring the fabric of historically significant features of theproperty.121  Vermont Historic Preservation grants are regularly awarded for preservation ofchurch steeples.122  Texas attempts to draw the line between appropriate and inappropriatepurposes by funding only “the difference between a rehabilitation project and a restorationproject”; the religious organization must pay the rehabilitation costs -- that which is necessary tomake the space useable -- and the Texas Trust Preservation Fund will assist in expendituresbeyond that point aimed at preserving or restoring the historic fabric of the property.123 
124Lieberman Letter, note 72 supra, at 15.
125See, e.g., email from Greg Griffith, Washington State HPO, to Joann Corey, supra note__ (“If a grant were to be awarded to a religious property, we would clearly restrict the use of thefunds to the preservation of character defining features of the building or a project that wouldassure preservation of the building for safety, structural, functional reasons (i.e., foundation,roofing, ADA compliance, etc.)”).
126See generally the National Park Service, Heritage Preservation Services, “HistoricPreservation Easements,” http://www2.cr.nps.gov/tps/tax/easement.htm (describing preservationeasments); Arkansas Historic Preservation Program, Historic Preservation and RestorationGrants Manual, http://www.arkansaspreservation.org/preservation/Grants_HPRG_Manual.pdf, at9;  Arkansas Historic Preservation Program, Conservation Easements,http://www.arkansaspreservation.org/preservation/easements.asp.  The Illinois Heritage Grantprogram has a sample covenant form available on its website:state.il.us/hpa/ps/hgmanual13covenant.pdf.
127See, e.g., Colorado Guide, note 114 supra, at 25 (describing variable terms of durationfor easements depending on the value of the grant received); Texas Guide, note 113 supra, at 6(same). 39
Connecticut, following the Lieberman Letter, restricts any state preservation grants “withoutwhich certain religious activities could not continue,” such as “extensive structural support workin a church,”124 although other states fund work on the basic structure and foundations ofreligious properties.125Finally, as a condition of receiving historic preservation grants, religious properties (likeall other grantees) typically must convey to the granting agency an historic preservationeasement.126  The easement binds the grantee and the grantee’s successors to both affirmative andnegative covenants, for a duration that may vary according to the value of the grant.  A smallgrant may require only an easement for a term of 10 years, while a substantial grant may requirean easement in perpetuity.127  The basic affirmative obligation is a promise to maintain thebenefitted property -- the whole property, typically, and not just the portion affected by the grant
128See, e.g., Maryland’s Historic Preservation Grant Program, Capital Grant Guidelines,http://www.marylandhistoricaltrust.net/capguide.pdf, at 10; Illinois Heritage Grant ProgramManual, FY 2002 Grant-in-Aid Program, http:// state.il.us/hpa/ps/hgmanual.htm (grant recipientscovenant to maintain their property according to the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards forHistoric Preservation Projects).
129The public access requirement is not unique to religious entities but is a general featureof public grants to non-governmental entities, and is typically included as an affirmativecovenant in the preservation easement.  The New Jersey program is a good example of thisrequirement:Public access is required to all resources receiving capital funds. The Trust andthe grantee will negotiate the days and hours that the property will be open, basedon the type of work funded by the grant, if the property is not accessible to thepublic at the time of application.•  A grant for exterior work requires the applicant to open the grounds tothe public, but does not compel the applicant to make the interioraccessible to the public. •  Interior work will require the applicant to open the building to thepublic.•  No additional access is necessary for properties open to the public on aregular basis, such as museums, libraries, or schools.New Jersey Guide, supra note 113, at 19.
130See Illinois Heritage Grants Covenant form, supra note 126; New Jersey Guide, supranote 113, at 19.  The power to enforce the easement is generally given to the preservation agencythat made the grant, but some grantors also permit the easement’s benefit to be given to adifferent (usually local) historic society.  See, e.g., Colorado Guide, supra note 114, at 25(permitting preservation grant recipients to give easement to other approved preservationsocieties).
131See Illinois Grants Covenant form, supra note 126 (citing specific remedies available tothe preservation agency). 40
-- according to specific preservation standards.128  In addition, grantees usually must guaranteereasonable public access to the property.129  The chief negative covenant is the grantee’s promisenot to make any changes, including demolition, to the historic features of the structure withoutthe express consent of the preservation agency.130  If the grantee breaches one of the covenants,the preservation agency is entitled to bring an action for whatever injunctive relief is appropriateto cure the breach, including  orders to restore improper changes to the structure or to maintainaspects of the property that the grantee has neglected.131
132 Lieberman Letter, note 72 supra, at 15 (requiring disclaimers of governmentendorsement, and suggesting limits to state financing of structural support). 
133 We develop this idea in Lupu & Tuttle, Distinctive Place, note 7 supra, at 78-92. 41
IV.  Preservation Grants, Constitutional Symmetry, and the New Separationism The story of historic preservation grants to religious institutions can be told in at least twoways.  The first is a tale of Religion Clause jurisprudence as an inexorable march fromSeparationism to Neutralism.  In this account, the Dellinger Memorandum, and the federalpolicies that rely on it, are anachronisms, the last vestiges of an era in which religious   institutions were systematically excluded from a variety of public benefits.  The ultimatedestination of this march lies beyond the Lieberman Letter, which gives only qualifiedpermission to the state historical commission to make grants to preserve religious properties.132 Neutralism, taken to its conclusion, ends up eliminating all distinctions between religious andsecular institutions.   In tension with the story of Neutralism's relentless leveling of the distinction betweenreligious and secular institutions is another account of contemporary Religion Clausejurisprudence.  This story, with which we are in sympathy, is one of redrawing rather thanobliterating the idea of Separationism.   Though earlier Separationists overstated thedistinctiveness of religious institutions, the Neutralists ignore the constitutionally salient reasonsfor maintaining limits on government with respect to such institutions.133  In this revised andmore limited Separationism, defining the boundary between sacred and secular remains theessential task of Religion Clause theory.   The distinctions reflected in contemporary statepolicies about preservation grants -- exterior vs. interior, liturgical items vs. others, structuralsupport vs. historic fabric -- represent intuitive efforts to discern, in ways more nuanced than theabsolute  Separationism reflected in the Dellinger Memorandum, this line between sacred and
134 See discussion in text at notes 43-45.
135 For discussion of the current exemption models used by legislatures and courts, seetext at notes 46-71, supra.
136Lupu & Tuttle, Distinctive Place, supra note 7, at 74-76 and 88-90. 42
secular.  At the heart of this more limited Separationism is the principle of Religion Clausesymmetry.  The requirement of symmetry is not an aesthetic one; rather, it reflects a larger,substantive theory of the Religion Clauses, pursuant to which the realm of worship of, and faithin, the transcendent lies beyond the jurisdiction of the state.134  This jurisdictional limit remainsthe same regardless of whether the legal context is one of regulatory burdens or state-conferredbenefits.If Religion Clause symmetry is a guiding principle, one helpful way to approach theproblem of linedrawing in the provision of government funds to religious institutions is toanalyze  the question of permissible government regulation of such institutions.   Like grant-making officials, courts and legislatures that have considered the application of landmarkingregimes to religious entities have wrestled with a  problem of linedrawing.  They have beenpressed to decide whether exemption should extend to all noncommercial property owned bysuch entities, or just houses of worship, or, more restrictive still, only the interiors of worshipstructures.135  Our own view, advanced in earlier work, is that a  Neutralist approach -- includinga robust, religion-neutral doctrine of compelled speech -- provides appropriate protection for theexterior of religious properties.136  The exteriors of houses or worship, like the exteriors of otherbuildings, often form vital parts of the shared landscape, the cultural environment of thecommunity in which the structures are located.  Regulation of the exterior of houses of worship, subject only to a religion-neutral doctrine
137 Although our analysis does not depend on the history of religious and legal attitudesabout the interior of worship spaces, that history suggests that these spaces have for thousands ofyears been thought to possess a special character.  Many viewed the interior of temples andchurches as sacred and holy ground, and excluded the unclean from these spaces.  Moreover, theconcept of sanctuary, though never respected in American law, recognized the interior ofreligious structures as embassy-like, territory foreign to the nation-state in which the structureswere located.  State agents, pursuing state purposes, could be excluded from them, and fugitivesfrom civil justice therefore could find refuge within them.  Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary: TheResurgence of an Age-old Right or a Dangerous Misinterpretation of an Abandoned AncientPrivilege?, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 747, 749-767 (1986) (describing history of religious and legalconception of sanctuary). 43
permitting escape from being compelled to advance a message to which the organization nolonger adheres, will allow for the landmarking of religious features of exterior design.  Steeples,religious gargoyles and statuary on the outside of a worship structure, and other exterior symbolsassociated with a faith tradition all fall within the scope of appropriate historic preservationorders, because all are visible to passersby and constitute part of the historically significantdesign features of the property or neighborhood.  With respect to the interior of houses of worship, however, we believe that Separationistconcerns about proper limits on the government's power with respect to religion requiredistinctive protections.   Although the government's aesthetic and historic reasons for regulatinginteriors are no different from the justification for regulating exteriors, state intrusion on theinterior of worship structures presents an unusually high risk that state agents will become co-authors of the religious experiences of those who worship in those spaces.  Even if state agentsmake efforts to be sensitive to those concerns, a negotiation between state officials and churchleaders over the location of an altar, or other liturgically significant features of interior design, would be an impermissible entanglement if ever one is to be found.137 This analysis of the scope of regulatory power over religious institutions suggests aresolution to the dilemma of historic preservation grants to such entities.  Because the state has
138Under the doctrine of compelled speech, a religious institution may be able to raise areligion-neutral constitutional defense to some types of regulation of the exterior, but theinstitution should also be free to waive that defense, and accept state regulation.  Whether thewaiver can be questioned or withdrawn by successors in interest with respect to the propertypresents a nice question, but not a religion-specific one.  In contrast, a religious institution cannotwaive the Establishment Clause concerns implicated in regulation of the interior of houses ofworship.
139 When the state finances the preservation of interiors of houses of worship on thecondition that the public be provided access to such spaces, there exists a possibility, howeverremote, that the state is impermissibly steering public viewers into a religious experience.  Suchsteering presents Establishment Clause questions akin to those presented in much stronger formby government-financed vouchers for purchase of services in religion-infused settings.  Fordiscussion of the steering problem associated with vouchers, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers and Sectarian ServiceProviders, xx J. Law & Politics xx, in Symposium, The End of Separatism (forthcoming, 2002).
140 If the benefit of the preservation were held by a non-governmental entity, the questionof enforcement of conditions involving the interior of worship spaces opens up difficultconstitutional questions about state action, of the sort initially addressed in Shelley v Kraemer,334 US 1 (1948). 44
constitutionally sufficient reasons to regulate the exterior of houses of worship, the state shouldalso be free to subsidize the preservation of these exteriors, including religious symbols thatconstitute a part of such exteriors.138  Both regulation and subsidy are justified by the public,secular purposes served by historic preservation of the exteriors of religious structures.In contrast, the state should be forbidden to subsidize what it cannot regulate, because thesubsidy will inevitably be accompanied by regulatory conditions.  The interiors of religiousspaces undoubtedly possess great architectural, historical, and cultural significance, but they arealso the places in which the faith envelops believers in the imagery and experience ofreverence.139  Even if the religious institution consents to government regulation of the interiorspace, as a condition of receiving a preservation grant, enforcement of such conditions involvesthe same constitutional defect as direct regulation.140  Although the government may solve thatproblem by providing grants for preservation of interiors without such conditions, unrestricted
141 Even the most avid supporters of neutralism in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793(2000) (plurality opinion), adhere to this proposition.  Id. at 8xx.  45
direct funding of religious entities raises different, and perhaps even greater, constitutionalproblems.  State expenditures require a public, secular purpose; without conditions that guaranteethat the money will be used for such a purpose, state transfers to religious institutions areforbidden.141Although it might seem solid, the boundary between interior and exterior presents somechallenging questions, best exemplified by the dilemma of stained-glass windows.  Suchwindows may have great historical or artistic significance, and make a substantial contribution tothe structure's external appearance.  Such windows often present religious themes, however, andhelp to create the worship experience through the play of light and imagery.  Following ourearlier mode of analysis, we look first at the regulatory question.  May the state require areligious entity to preserve and maintain stained-glass windows that convey religious themes andare visible from within the sanctuary?  We think the answer must be no.  State control over thereligious imagery in a worship space involves the entanglement concerns that motivate our basicjudgment about state regulation of the interiors of houses of worship.  If the state may notregulate the windows because of the religious imagery visible from within the worship space, thestate also may not pay for the preservation or maintenance of such windows.With respect to stained-glass windows that do not involve religious themes, regulationdesigned to preserve such windows presents a closer constitutional question.  On the one hand,the use of color in such windows, and the ways in which they regulate the flow of light into theworship space, may shape religious experience.  This argument, however, may prove too muchfor our taste; by analogy, at least some exterior features, such as building height, may also
46
influence the experience of worshipers within.  In our view, where the windows do not portrayreligious themes, or  are not visible from within the worship space, the case for state financingbecomes considerably stronger.Even if our intuitions about the constitutional status of historic preservation grants meetwith some disagreement – and we expect that they will – we think that the context of historicpreservation of houses of worship provides a rich context for exploring fundamental questionsabout the relationship between the state and religious institutions.  Neither the strongSeparationist solution, which would forbid both regulation and subsidy of the historic characterof houses of worship, nor the Neutralist's acceptance of regulation and subsidy of religiousentities on equal terms with other institutions, tracks the current trajectory of constitutional law.  Moreover, neither view captures the dual nature of religious institutions, perhaps best reflected intheir structures, which are at once the places in which the defining activity of the faith occurs,and at the same time vital parts of the community's historical and cultural legacy.
